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European Community
By James M.
Rogers
Threats to
the security, prosperity, values and interests
of the EU in the 21st century are evolving and
have changed in many ways. The threat of wide
scale invasion has subsided, and there seems
to be no plausible candidate willing or able
to lead the EU in this new environment.
The US is
Europe's ally, China has no "power projection"
capabilities, India is an EU partner and
Russia has fallen off the top table of world
affairs. While the threat of long-range
nuclear attack remains possible, especially
from unpredictable and aggressive
authoritarian regimes, new technologies such
as anti-ballistic missile shielding are now
becoming available. Because of these issues,
many of the classical threats to our security
have either declined, or have ceased to be a
major area of concern.
Rather, we
are today faced with a proliferation of new,
dynamic and unforeseen threats, which can
potentially fade as quickly as they emerge.
The
European Security Strategy,
compiled by the EU in 2003, highlighted a
number of these including Islamist terrorism,
the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, state failure and bad governance,
organized crime, regional conflict and global
warming.
In addition,
the EU's unwillingness, weakness and inability
to address these problems was also highlighted
in the report as a cause for concern.
The strategy
also prescribed "offensive defence" with the
statement: "Our traditional concept of
self-defence - up to and including the Cold
War - was based on the threat of invasion.
With the new threats, the first line of
defence will often be abroad." In other words,
only by actively intervening in foreign
countries can we achieve a better level of
security for ourselves.
But there is
also self-evidently a threat from within, even
if that threat's ideological fuel comes from
North Africa and the Middle East. Given the
growing number of terror attacks and attempts
in Europe, the last of which occurred in
London and Glasgow, Islamist extremism is
clearly one of the most dangerous threats and
will likely be with us for some time to come.
The other threats might also strike in the
years ahead, and the EU must be ready to meet
them, not only with capabilities of both a
civilian and military nature, but also with
institutions fit for purpose. Equally, the EU
needs a constantly evolving strategic
doctrine, able to produce a useful and
coherent response after tragedies and offer
preventive and pre-emptive strategies.
The Reform
Treaty, when ratified, will go a long way in
addressing these shortcomings with actions
such as naming a "High Representative of Union
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy," who will
bring about greater operational collaboration
between the European Council and the European
Commission in foreign affairs and security
policy; creating an "External Action Service"
that provides a centralized department for
diplomatic exchange between the member states
and Brussels; a "solidarity clause" so that
the EU is obliged to come to the aid of any of
its member states should they come under
attack; and employing a "legal personality"
providing the EU with the ability to sign
international treaties and join international
organizations, similarly to a nation state.
All of these
changes will undoubtedly empower the EU and
its member states, providing them with greater
influence, reach and authority. They will
augment and better organise the institutions
of the EU's "second pillar" such as its
foreign, security and defence institutions.
What is also
needed, however, is a European Security
Council comprised of civil servants, military
officers, development experts, policy advisors
and academic strategists from both the level
of the 27 member states and the EU. The
Security Council should be under the double
custodianship of the new permanent president
of the European Council and the new high
representative, perhaps absorbing or working
alongside Directorate-General E, which is in
charge of business related to foreign and
security policy.
Officials
from other countries under the EU's strategic,
political and economic sway might also be
invited to participate, if only in an advisory
role. Such representatives could come from
Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Ukraine, Georgia
and Moldova, or from the Western Balkans,
Turkey and Israel.
The European
Security Council's role could be to provide a
unified institutionalised setting at the
European level for the relentless assessment
of security threats and strategic challenges.
It could give advice to the president of the
Council of the European Union, the high
representative and the member states. It could
be a centralised agency for member states to
exchange and assess global and domestic
intelligence. The Security Council would
provide a platform for input from the EU
Institute for Security Studies and the
European Defence Agency, as well as from
foreign offices and defence ministries in the
respective member states. Finally, it could
bestow a podium for the formal exchange of
ideas about foreign, security and defence
policies between academics and think-tank
personnel with European practitioners and
officials.
The
considerable inflow of information and
expertise, allied to its political setting
within the Council of the European Union,
would grant the European Security Council the
capacity and proficiency to update the
European Security Strategy, either
annually or indeed, every two years. This
would provide a regular, authoritative and
institutionalised process for composing and
revising EU security and defence doctrine.
The Security
Council could also be called to meet after a
disaster or attack, in order to provide advice
to the Council of Foreign Ministers and the
High Representative. Further, the European
Security Council would afford European
citizens a clearer understanding of the
foreign, security and defence policies of
their homeland.
A European
Security Council is something worthy of
greater consideration, especially in a world
of shifting threats, and where a plethora of
new actors and rising powers are emerging.
Should one be created, it should probably wait
until after the Reform Treaty is implemented
across the continent. What is clear, however,
is that a distinct institution, sending out a
signal of European determination to be a major
global power, would allow the EU to engage
with other like-minded countries in countering
shared security challenges.
©2007 James M. Rogers
James M. Rogers is a Research Associate of
Civitatis International. He is the DRS Scholar at Pembroke
College, University of Cambridge. His doctoral
research concerns the evolving security and
defence policy of the European Union. He also runs the
Global Power Europe Blog. An
earlier version of this article was published
by the
International Relations and Security Network
on 3rd July 2007.
